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Abstract: This research examines the new political phenomenon of feminist foreign policy, which 
aims to recenter foreign policy construction and implementation in a humanist framework. Fem-
inist foreign policy arose in the 2010’s as a response to traditional foreign policy approaches, 
which have not been effective in combatting systemic violence and inequalities upheld by nation-
states. Sweden and Canada, in 2014 and 2017, respectively, were the first to launch feminist for-
eign policy initiatives and pledged to apply a human rights approach in promoting gender equali-
ty and women’s empowerment in their foreign affairs strategies. Drawing upon government 
handbooks, primary sources, and both international and transnational feminist theory, this re-
search will address several questions. Can a state feminism adequately and comprehensively 
serve the need for a feminist consciousness in the seemingly “gender-neutral” field of in-
ternational relations? How does a state feminism measure up to a transnational feminist ac-
tivism? This paper will attempt to answer these questions through a comparative critical analysis 
of both Sweden and Canada’s contemporary feminist foreign policy agendas. Further, this study 
will analyze the impact of a feminist foreign policy in the Middle East and North African region. 
Both analytical works and government-published handbooks and statistics describe these Femi-
nist foreign policy initiatives as a strategy to promote and attain a more just global order. This 
research will suggest that foreign policy development could benefit from the reintroduction of 
traditionally “feminine” areas of academic discourse, such as phenomenology and care ethics, to 
international relations. However, the efficacy of a state feminism must be addressed in conversa-
tion with other feminist approaches, such as transnational feminist activism, which includes local 
initiatives. 
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1. Introduction 
 A new perspective to foreign policy has emerged on the international stage, for the first 
time claiming to be explicitly “feminist” in its approach. A “feminist” approach to international 
relations is based on the fundamental principle of gender equality and awareness of the fact that, 
until today, policymaking, including foreign policymaking, has failed to include and consider the 
voices, needs, and interests of all those affected—girls, boys, women, and men alike. This ap-
proach not only serves to analyze and inform policymaking, but also to guide the work of gov-
ernments around the world. 
 “Feminist” foreign policy first gained international prominence when former Swedish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Margot Wallstrom, announced a new policy, feministisk utrikespoli-
tik, in October 2014, (Gennarini and Oas). Just three years later, in June of 2017, Canada became 
the second country to adopt a Feminist International Assistance Policy under the liberal govern-
ment of Justin Trudeau, (Robinson, 2). In her foreword to the policy, Marie-Claude Bibeau, Min-
ister of International Development, stated that “we need to make sure that women and girls are 
empowered to reach their full potential so they can earn their own livelihoods, which will benefit 
families as well as the economic growth of their communities and countries,”(Robinson, 6). Tak-
ing a human rights–based approach, the Canadian government has pledged that, by 2022, 95% of 
their international assistance budget would be directed towards “gender equality” and “women’s 
empowerment,” (Canada's National Action Plan 2017-2022). At its most basic level, a feminist 
foreign policy calls upon the state to prioritize gender equality and women’s rights in its in-
ternational dealings. A feminist foreign policy further pledges to recognize women and girls as 
unique actors in the global community, with needs and contributions that differ to those of men.  
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 This research project investigates why such a foreign policy agenda was seen as neces-
sary, and what a feminist foreign policy agenda means in theory and in practice through a com-
parative analysis of Sweden and Canada’s respective approaches. Further, this project will exam-
ine how a feminist foreign policy is received by countries in the Middle East and North Africa, a 
region that continues to be impacted by damaging legacies of Western intervention and colonial 
efforts. I will synthesize government handbooks, UN activity, interviews with experts, and both 
international and transnational feminist theory, to suggest that foreign policy development could 
benefit from the reintroduction of traditionally “feminine” areas of academic discourse, such as 
phenomenology. However, the efficacy of a state feminism must be addressed in conversation 
and practice with other feminist approaches, such as transnational feminist activism and efforts 
spearheaded by local groups. 
 The first section of this report outlines academic discussions of the past 30 years that pre-
cede and support feminist foreign policy agendas in order to present a frame for analysis of how 
these policies have come to fruition. Feminists have been critiquing international relations and 
foreign policy and practice since the 1960s, with several feminist scholars such as Cynthia Enloe, 
Karen Garner, and Ann Tickner arguing that traditional approaches in the field favor a “gender-
blind,” “masculinist” approach. That is to say, “unmarked” foreign policy, like the “unmarked” 
body, places the masculine point of view at the center of its paradigm, culture, and history, there-
by marginalizing femininity, and masquerading as “gender-neutral,” (Smith). In the second sec-
tion of the paper, I outline the specific motivations for and applications of the Swedish and 
Canadian feminist foreign policies, respectively. In the third section, I discuss and analyze the 
connections made and found between several Middle Eastern states and feminist foreign policy 
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agendas. This section has been shaped by the materials and resources that are available, and thus 
this paper does not attempt to make comparative judgements based on which countries in the re-
gion are included and excluded from the analysis. Some countries such as Turkey have intro-
duced state feminism projects, while in other cases, nations have begun employing a “feminist” 
strategy in their various dealings with states such as Syria, Afghanistan,  Tunisia, and Saudi Ara1 -
bia, among others. In this section, I describe and discuss these arguments while further compli-
cating them by including Middle Eastern “state feminism” projects and critiques of colonizing 
projects by scholars of transnational feminism and post-colonialism. In particular, I will include 
scholarship from Gayatri Spivak and Chandra Talpade Mohanty in order to examine critiques of 
the current feminist foreign policies. Further, I will examine whose, or which feminism is being 
employed in both Canada and Sweden’s respective “feminist” approaches. In my concluding sec-
tion, I consider the efficacy of these policies and expand upon the larger implications of the in-
troduction of a feminist foreign policy. 
2. Feminist Theory & Practice in International Relations 
 In this section I will include a selection of actions taken by the international relations 
community that lead to the inception of an explicitly “feminist” foreign policy. Further, I will 
outline a brief history of feminist theory which will inform the ongoing arguments of this project. 
 Understanding “gender-neutral” practice as “gender-blind” practice 
 Since the mid-19th century, feminist scholars of international relations have denounced 
the field as, “one of the most gender-blind, indeed crudely patriarchal, of all the institutionalized 
forms of contemporary social and political analysis,” (Jones, 405) Scholars including Cynthia 
 While Afghanistan not traditionally regarded as a part of the Middle East and North Africa region, linguistic, reli1 -
gious, and cultural ties remain that call for its inclusion in this paper
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Enloe, Karen Garner, and Ann Tickner argue that while gender is fundamental to the constitution 
of the state and the inter-state system, international actors have rarely behaved as though this 
were the case. Since the inception of the modern international relations system after the first 
World War, foreign policymaking has been undoubtedly gender-blind, rather than gender-neutral. 
That is to say, nations have not taken the initiative to address foreign policy issues in a gender-
sensitive way, and often employ a “one-size-fits-all” framework. Feminist theory has indeed 
shown that traditionally, international relations is in fact gender-blind, and thus the embedded 
masculinism of the study and practice of the field has been made integral to its very identity, 
(Tickner, et al., 33)   
 Thus, states and other international actors have been masculinist without intentionally or 
overtly pursuing the “interests” of men. Therefore, it is not surprising that the study and practice 
of international relations has historically placed the masculine point of view at the center of its 
paradigm, culture, and history, thereby marginalizing femininity, and masquerading as “gender-
neutral.” In truth, threats to human security may be economic or environmental in nature or may 
be driven by racial or ideological or religious differences, but, they are always gendered (Garner, 
39) This androcentrism has been built into all constructs of Western civilization, and it cannot be 
adequately addressed simply by “adding women,” (Scheyer and Kumskova, 57) Rather, a radical 
restructuring of thought and analysis must occur, in order to take into account the lives experi-
ence of women and girls when drawing conclusions or generalizations. This task would also re-
quire an untangling of masculinized notions of power and protection. Gendered misunderstand-
ings influence ideas of the state and what must be protected, and identity informs the ways in 
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which gendered protection and ideas of the state enact different policies that remain underwritten 
by masculinist impulses and conceptions, (Tickner, 83). 
 The domination of masculinity over femininity is a structural pattern that may have exist-
ed prior to the development of the states system. However, the gender division of masculine pub-
lic and feminine private spheres submerged within civil society is one of the foundations upon 
which modern European states were built and postcolonial states beyond Europe were subse-
quently established, (Tickner, 33). This public-private division takes particular forms with specif-
ic manifestations in different Western and non-Western contexts. However, gender structures 
similarly differentiate male and female, masculine and feminine, rational and emotional, public 
and private in mutually constitutive ways, (Tickner, 33). These structures continue to play a cru-
cial role in the constitution of state identities, diplomatic practices, and the maintenance and 
transformation of international relations. Gender-blind policy permits masculinism to underwrite 
not only policy but also the very identities of a state. Of course, this system cannot be undone by 
merely adding the language of “girls and women” to gender-blind policy and practice. Instead, 
the system requires a radical restructuring ands analysis which comes to terms with the reality 
that women’s experiences must be valued at every level of the international decision-making 
process.  
“Feminist” practice in the international relations community 
 International institutions have concerned themselves with so-called “gender issues” since 
the mid-20th century, especially as they relate to conflict and war. Wartime language and practice 
often hinges upon essentialist gender stereotypes. Male leaders who determined war policies and 
who built military institutions drew on notions of Western hegemonic, heterosexual, and aggres-
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sive masculinity to cultivate male power and dominance, and utilized misogyny and homophobia 
to train military recruits, (Garner, 67). This militarized masculinity reinforces male dominance in 
a society in wartime and even extends into post-conflict “peacetime.” If “peace” is constructed as 
“feminine,” then “war” is constructed as “masculine,” (Garner, 42). That is, essentialist gender 
constructions of women as “natural” peacemakers as well as “maternalist” critiques of violent 
and aggressive militarized masculinity put forth during twentieth-century wars have also rein-
forced the dominant male-over-female gender power relations post-conflict. This reinforced gen-
der binaries in Western and non-Western societies between private, feminized spheres, and pub-
lic, masculinized spheres, and justifies male-over-female gender power hierarchies. Warring 
groups have employed gendered forms of coercive force to defeat their enemies and to overcome 
internal resistance to war within their own group.  
 Although sexual violence, which disproportionately affects women, has been a tool of 
warfare occurring across cultures, it was not described as a weapon of war by the international 
relations community until the 20th century. The tactic to use rape as a weapon of war to “emas-
culate” the enemy’s men and to “spoil” the enemy’s women, (Garner, 42) is one build upon gen-
dered stereotypes of dominance and power. Even the language of war itself, which entices young 
men and boys to “defend the motherland,” serves as a way of understanding ones-self through 
masculinized notions of men as strong protectors and women as sufferers in need of this milita-
rized protection. Sexual violence and rape are prevalent in regions of war as well as in refugee 
camps, and 80 percent of the world’s refugees are women and children, (Women for Women In-
ternational). Rape is a crime of domination, not an act driven by sexual desire. As such, during 
wars, rape becomes a weapon of war often utilized to dominate the enemy. According to feminist 
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international relations theorist Karen Garner, “directing global attention to the mass rapes taking 
place in Bosnia allowed feminists to redefine the rape as a “weapon” used to “humiliate, shame, 
degrade, and terrify an entire population,” (Garner, 85) These reports also resulted in the wide-
spread recognition of rape in war on the international agenda and in legal human rights discours-
es, which was a crucial moment for feminists to transform the political discourse and institution-
al policy regarding women’s rights.  
 Along with an expansive history of women’s activism, feminist scholarship, and critical 
approaches to international affairs, groundbreaking international attention on the issues of 
women and girls, as legitimized by institutions such as the United Nations, has contributed to 
what is today called “feminist foreign policy.” Prior to the establishment of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1993, rape and other forms of sexual assault had 
been classified as “lesser crimes” under the Geneva Conventions, not as “grave breaches” of in-
ternational law, (Garner, 87). Since then, United Nations agreements have begun addressing the 
special needs of women and girls during times of conflict, in particular with the landmark UN 
Security Council Resolution 1325 passed in 2000, which illuminated states’ obligations to pro-
tect women and girls in conflict zones and to ensure that women were involved in all aspects of 
conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building.  
 Sweden played a leading role in the implementation of Resolution 1325, presenting its 
first action plan as early as 2006, (Aggestam, 31). UNSCR 1325 both recognized women as both 
in need of specialized protection, as well as key actors in promoting peace and stability. Veronika 
Wand-Danielsson, who has served as the Swedish Ambassador to NATO and France, discusses 
the impact that UNSCR 1325 has had on the development of Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy: 
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In military operations, if we want to do a good job and  produce results, we have to have 
the understanding and acknowledge and develop all those tools in the military framework 
to be able to meet the target groups. Then to be able to draw intelligence from women, 
you have to approach them differently. Resolution 1325 has been more important and still 
used more often… Having women advisors in these key positions will access other 
women, and the information that women will gather will be different. 
 The Government of Canada also described its 2019 action plan as, “guided by UN Secu-
rity Council resolution 1325 and subsequent UN resolutions on Women, Peace, and Security, 
(WPS)” (Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy, 2020). However, progress has been 
stalled on swiftly implementing UNSCR 1325. Significant barriers to achieving the objective of 
the resolution include the structural exclusion and devaluation of women in peace processes, 
(Subramanian-Montgomery, et al.). There is also a widespread problem of simply viewing 
women as victims and not recognizing their potential as active participants in the process of 
building a more stable and secure world.  
 Lieutenant Colonel and military officer leading on the integration of Women, Peace and 
Security in the UK Defense, Rachel Grimes, further discusses barrier to implementing 1325 dur-
ing her time in the UK Defense, that it was seen as a “product of Western ideals” and not an 
agreed-upon consensus of human rights advocacy: 
 Whenever I've been teaching a mixed audience, or just talking to senior male officers, 
about why the military should be implementing 1325, I frequently hear that it's a Western 
value that I can't expect. But when British soldiers aren't learning in Afghanistan, or in 
Iraq, or anywhere that has traditional conservative values that we the Brits should not be 
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trying to put onto that culture. I find that hugely offensive. And I'm almost, I mean, I left 
the army and part of the reason why I left the army was, that that was a contributing fac-
tor to my decision, because I felt like I was having to argue with people to do the right 
thing. And yet, they would go back to this cultural argument that we're trying to change 
other people's cultures and religions. And they weren't looking at it from a human rights 
perspective. 
 How is the “woman problem” handled, or not handled, during national crises? Rachel 
Grimes discussed this trend as it relates to the implementation of UNSCR 1325: 
People say, ‘look, be patient, we need to deal with something else,’ and overlook the fact 
that if they had included a general perspective, they could probably have developed a 
way more sophisticated plan that would be more successful… On 1325, it kind of has this 
dual action plan built in, in terms of addressing women who are victims of gender based 
violence during wartime but also getting women to participate on the back end of deci-
sion making and peacekeeping. To me, I'm surprised and disappointed, but I think that on 
the whole, the majority of militaries who looked at plans for support to other countries 
interventions in other countries are not looking at it from a gender perspective —not yet. 
I think that some of them are aware of it. I think that their senior officers can speak quite 
eloquently about subjects. But, I think if you were able to dive down into the planning 
process, you would discover that, apart from maybe somebody saying, ‘of course, we're 
thinking about agendas perspective,’ it would be challenging to find countries which are 
actually integrating 1325 into their operations. 
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The introduction of feminist foreign policy internationally 
 A feminist foreign policy is the policy of a state that defines its interactions with other 
states and movements in a manner that prioritizes gender equality and enshrines the human rights 
of women and other traditionally marginalized groups, allocated significant resources to achieve 
that vision, and seeks through its implementation to disrupt patriarchal and male-dominated 
power structures across all of its levers of influence (aid, trade, defense, and diplomacy), in-
formed by the voices of feminist activists, groups, and movements.” (Thomson, 2) A feminist 
foreign policy implies a collaborative effort between the state that develops the policy and the 
states with which it engages, and requires an “ethical commitment to the care and support of dis-
tant others,” (Aggestam, 38). Perhaps one of the most important tenants, feminist foreign policy 
calls for need of feminist consciousness as vital rather than peripheral to an effective and “gen-
der-just” foreign policy. 
3. Feminist Foreign Policy in Sweden and Canada 
 In this section I will detail the Swedish and Canadian feminist foreign policy agendas. I 
will include reactions to these policies and further compare their motivations and applications. 
While the Swedish model includes gender equality as a goal in itself, the Canadian model views 
achieving gender equality as a key component in achieving the country’s greater goal of eradicat-
ing poverty. This section will outline specific policy which is directed towards nations in the 
Middle East and North Africa region. 
Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy 
 The Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy’s theoretical framework is largely connected to the 
tenants that Margot Wallstrom described in “A Womanly Virtue: Female Representation as Glob-
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al Security Strategy,” published in the Harvard International Review in 2010.  In this article 
Margot Wallstrom outlined the gender-blind nature of international relations and made the case 
for the more equitable inclusion of women. Wallstrom argued that men act as a barrier to 
women’s full participation and leadership in politics: “This situation arises not from a shortage of 
capable women, nor from lack of ambition, interest, or ability in women. Rather, it arises from 
men choosing men,” (Wallstrom, 31). She states that the “glass ceilings,” “glass walls,” and 
“sticky floors,” while legitimate concepts of gender inequalities built upon stereotypes, have not 
been what is primarily holding back women in politics. Rather, she points to “a thick layer of 
men” which has prevented women from reaching the top, (Wallstrom, 30).  
 Wallstrom contends that there can be no sustainable development without equitable devel-
opment, and there can be no equitable development without gender equality,” (Wallstrom, 30) 
She lays out the widespread detrimental consequences of  what this “thick layer of men” is pro-
hibiting. Gender-equal representation is not called upon for its own sake; women bring different 
attitudes to the negotiating table and to the political agenda, and can contribute valuable experi-
ence given the roles they fulfill in their communities and their families. Equal gender representa-
tion is about filling the democratic deficit, creating a more balanced society, and making deci-
sions that better represent the people. According to Wallstrom, Sweden’s feminist foreign policy 
is about systematically and holistically implementing policies that contribute to gender equality 
and the full enjoyment of human rights of all women and girls (Wallstrom, 30). 
 Further, Wallstrom argues that women’s participation at all levels of international decision-
making is crucial to not only more traditional “hard” security threats, such as war, peace build-
ing, and post-conflict reconstruction, but also in countering “soft” security issues, such as educa-
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tion and infrastructure. Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy centers gender equality not only as a 
goal in itself, but as a precondition for achieving its wider foreign, development, and security 
policy objectives. Thus, the Swedish model refutes the differentiation between “hard” and “soft” 
security as highly gendered and falsely prioritizing. Instead, Feminist Foreign Policy is rooted in 
a positive concept of peace and security that includes dimensions of human security, such as eq-
uitable and sustainable development as well as social cohesion. It also points to the fact that sus-
tainable peace can only be achieved if all those dimensions are addressed. 
 While the Swedish government assumed a “feminist” identity and announced its adoption 
of a Feminist Foreign Policy in 2014, the policy had not yet been fully formulated, and it took 
some time for the Swedish government to elaborate on how Feminist Foreign Policy would tran-
spire in practice. The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs released the official Handbook outlin-
ing Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy in August of 2018.  
 According to the Handbook, the nation’s foreign policy goals are to be achieved through a 
theoretical focus on the so-called three “Rs’”– Rights, Representation and Resources , which are 
anchored in the fourth “R” — Reality, (Handbook, Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy). Accord-
ing to the policy, Sweden shares a formal commitment to ensuring the rights of girls and women 
globally, whether it be through the support for the prohibition of female genital mutilation and 
forced marriage, equal rights to inheritance and education, or the rights to sexual and reproduc-
tive health. The importance of women’s representation is emphasized throughout the Handbook, 
which argues that it should be second nature for policymakers to ask if women are being repre-
sented and whether women are allocated the same resources as men when formulating foreign 
policy and delegating resources internationally. The third R refers to the “shifting of resources” 
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to conflict prevention and peace building with a gender lens, although it remains unclear from 
where these resources are being shifted. Wallstrom argued that providing resources for humani-
tarian aid and peace processes is not a humanitarian problem, but a political problem. She posit-
ed that the inclusion of women “transcends the divide between hard and soft security and enables 
sustainable peace building.” All of the “Rs” are to be informed by the unique and specific reality 
of the women being reached by the Feminist Foreign Policy.  
 The six primary focus areas for the implementation of Feminist Foreign Policy in the 
Handbook are: (1) To strengthen women and girls’ human rights in humanitarian situations; (2) 
To fight and prevent gender-based and sexual violence against women and girls in conflict and 
post-conflict situations; (3) To promote women’s participation as actors in peace processes and 
peace promoting measures; (4) To promote women and girls’ participation in the work for eco-
nomic, social and environmental sustainable development; (5) To strengthen women and girls’ 
economic independence and their access to economic resources, including though productive 
work under decent living conditions; (6)To strengthen sexual and reproductive rights for girls 
and young people. When describing the motivation for the policy, Former Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Margot Wallstrom described that, “we see it as an objective in itself to achieve gender 
equality and human rights. However, we also see gender equality as an essential element in order 
to achieve other objectives, such as sustainable peace, security and development,” (Handbook, 
Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy). 
Implementation 
In October 2017, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs released a report outlining the 
most significant changes and results in The Foreign Service’s practice since the implementation 
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of a Feminist Foreign Policy just three years prior, in regards to the six objectives outlined in the 
Handbook. In March of 2018, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs published a similar report, further 
outlining progress that was made following the “Three R’s" model. In the 2016 - 2020 Women, 
Peace, and Security Action Plan, the Swedish government outlined 12 countries which would be 
particularly prioritized for foreign missions. A third of these countries are located in the Middle 
East: Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, and Syria. Additionally, the Swedish WPS Action Plan indi-
cated the African Union as a key regional partner for its implementation. Further, the government 
described how it had contributed to highlighting the link between gender equality and childcare 
in Tunisia. In 2016 an expert visit and seminar on preschools and Swedish children’s literature 
focusing on gender equality were held in cooperation with the Swedish Institute and attended by, 
among others, Tunisia’s gender equality minister. The Swedish Embassy has followed up on this 
with other initiatives, including the launch of the “Swedish Dads” photo exhibition and a collab-
orative project with UNICEF to further develop the concept with a focus on Tunisian fathers. As 
Tunisia is in the process of building and reforming its childcare system and thus increasing 
women’s ability to participate in social and political life, this active exchange of experience is 
believed to have contributed to the thinking around these issues. 
In 2017, the Swedish government described that it had supported the participation of Syr-
ian women in political processes at local and international level, and in the Women’s Advisory 
Committee of the Syrian opposition. With support from Sweden, the Women’s Advisory Com-
mittee has contributed to several rounds of the UN-led peace talks in Geneva and strengthened 
its influence, thereby enabling it to impact the opposition’s vision for the future so that it sets a 
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quota of 30 percent women in political bodies. Rachel Grimes further discusses gender quotas 
and their impacts in successful gender mainstreaming: 
I think there's a balance, probably not gotten balanced yet. But I am hugely proponent of 
the tipping point, I think that you can see this with race relations, I think you can see it 
with having a more diverse workforce. But if you can reach 25, 30%… I think that an 
organization that has 25, 30% women in it will start to have a different outlook. And you 
could look at the thinking the Norway introduced this rule that every company or CEO 
has to have 25% 30% of women on board. And the way the board in the meeting started 
to operate changed and apparently became more successful. But on the whole what I read 
is that when you have a diverse and inclusive organization, it's more productive. So I feel 
that for the UN, and for most militaries, it's going to be painful for the women that come 
in at the beginning. Because they will be a novelty, and they will be different. If you can 
get to that tipping point, I think that the environments will become more and more 
women-wanted. 
In 2018, Sweden reported to have established a leadership program for women leaders 
and entrepreneurs in the Saudi Arabian business sector. The program also served as a network for 
Swedish and Saudi Arabian business sector actors. Further, Swedish funding has supported the 
training of thousands of new midwives per year in Afghanistan. Another example of Sweden’s 
reported contribution to women’s entrepreneurship and employment is the through the funding of 
networks of local support centers for women based on the Swedish model of women’s networks 
for economic empowerment and on collaboration between civil society, the state, the private sec-
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tor and academia. In Armenia, support to local networks has resulted in the establishment of 
more than ten support centers. These centers have created jobs and skills development opportuni-
ties for vulnerable women as a way of promoting their empowerment, leading in turn to, “greater 
self-confidence and increased interest in political engagement and participation,” (Sweden's 
Feminist Foreign Policy – Examples from Three Years of Implementation, 2017). 
 One key to the implementation of several of Sweden’s feminist campaigns is the usage of 
social media. In 2017, Sweden allocated an additional SEK 200 million to the #SheDecides 
movement, which works with local organizations to form a global network of support for 
women’s and girls’ bodily autonomy and reproductive agency and education. Similar social me-
dia movements supported by the Swedish government include the #WikiGap, #Midwives4all, 
#SheTrades, #MoreWomenMorePeace, #HeForShe and #SwedishDads. #SwedishDads is an on-
line trend which features Swedish fathers on paternity leave, a practice that Swedish families 
have been entitled to since 1974.  
 While paternity leave is not explicitly outlined as an implementation measure in Swedish 
Feminist Foreign Policy, the Handbook and 2017 follow-up report include further language di-
rected to boys and men as key actors in the pursuit of a more feminist world. The Handbook de-
scribes how, “influencing negative and stereotypical masculinity norms is important, as is chang-
ing attitudes and behaviors among men and boys who represent and act based on such 
norms,” (Handbook, Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy). Further, the Handbook includes the 
message that it is important to involve men and boys in the work to prevent conflict and to com-
bat gender-related and sexual violence. It is also highlighted that unpaid housework and caring 
must be shared equally between men and women, as well as that men and boys especially need to 
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be involved in order to change attitudes regarding the usage of contraception in developing coun-
tries. 
 The 2019 - 2022 action plan for Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy describes the first five 
years of the policy as a success. Certainly, Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy handbook clearly 
outlines the special attention given to the way policy is formulated in Stockholm. The current 
action plan for Feminist Foreign Policy prioritizes three areas for improvement: (1) Promotion of 
women's and girls' economic and social conditions, (2) Increased efforts for sexual and reproduc-
tive health and rights, and (3) Enhanced action on the Women, Peace and Security agenda, (The 
Swedish Foreign Service Action Plan for Feminist Foreign Policy 2019–2022). 
 However, due to the relative recentness of the implementation, information regarding spe-
cific outcomes in the policy’s target countries are not well-documented. The most recent gov-
ernment report of outcomes that Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy has contributed to was issued 
in 2017. In this update, the Swedish government claimed that a Swedish-backed program is 
thought to have, “prevented hundreds of thousands unwanted pregnancies and unsafe abortions 
in East Africa,” (Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy – Examples from Three Years of Implemen-
tation, 2017). Further Swedish funding has lead to thousands of midwives having been trained in 
Afghanistan, Myanmar, South Sudan, Zambia and other countries. Sweden has also started a 
network for women peace mediators, which has “inspired” the emergence of similar mediation 
networks in Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. The report further shows that be-
tween 2015 and 2016, Sweden increased its support to women's organizations by 35 percent 
within the framework of development cooperation. In 2017, an extra SEK 200 million was allo-
cated at the same time as Sweden helped found the She Decides movement. In this year, Sweden 
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was the largest donor of core support to the UN body for gender equality and women's and girls' 
empowerment, (Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy – Examples from Three Years of Implementa-
tion, 2017). 
Feminist foreign policy and trade 
 What does gender equality in trade mean? To begin, gender-blind trade policy benefits 
men more than women. Additionally, women’s poverty can largely be linked to a lack of access 
to economic resources and financial services. The growing share of the world’s population of 
women living below the poverty line is often attributed to the “feminization of poverty,” (Garner, 
150) The feminization of poverty was first recognized as a global phenomenon in the 1980s. It is 
a consequence of the combined adverse effects of gender discrimination, neoliberal economic 
policies, and the globalization of the labor market. Even as the global capitalist workforce em-
ployed more women than at any time previously in world history, women faced more barriers 
than men to “lifting themselves” out of poverty, (Moghadam, 39). Gendered divisions of labor 
has persisted, in that “men’s work” is constructed as paid, productive, independent work that 
provides the primary income for the family; “women’s work” is constructed as unpaid, reproduc-
tive, dependent, and supplementary to the family income, (Garner, 151).  
 Consequently, more often than men, women worldwide were employed as part-time, tem-
porary, or casual labor, which allowed global capitalist powers to pay women lower wages to 
minimize labor costs and maximize profits. Moreover, women worldwide continued to serve as 
the primary, and unpaid, household laborers and caregivers for children within their families. 
Thus, economists such as Ester Boserup and others devised the phrase, “feminization of labor” to 
describe the devaluation and disempowerment of women in the global labor market, (Garner, 
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150). To ensure that trade enhances opportunities for women, policymakers should assess the po-
tential impact of trade rules on various groups of people and develop policy responses based on 
evidence. Additionally, gender-sensitive policy must be implemented with a diverse understand-
ing of gender equality as it relates to trade. Gender equality cannot only be measured by 
women’s access to economic participation. Rather, women’s employment must be considered 
alongside the generation and accumulation of capital, assets, and wages, as well as consumption 
and related decisions affecting individual and household well-being.  
 Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy Handbook addresses not only humanitarian action, but 
also trade and the financial sector. The Handbook argues that there is also overwhelming evi-
dence that gender equality boosts economic growth, even if governments and businesses contin-
ue to act as though this is not the case. With this in mind, the Swedish government’s feminist 
trade policy includes several focus areas which are dedicated to efforts ensuring that trade policy 
and trade promotion activities benefit women and men equally. In regards to the financial sector, 
the Swedish government views gender as a market access issue, and pledges to give priority in 
trade negotiations to sectors, products and services that have positive implications for women. 
 The Swedish Handbook outlines several measures to pursue gender sensitive trade policy. 
The government now requires that a “gender analysis” must be part of impact assessments and 
sustainability impact assessments conducted in connection with trade negotiations. Similarly, it 
states that sectors, products and services that have positive gender impacts must be given priority 
in trade negotiations, and that “gender experts” must be given a greater role in policy making to 
ensure better results. Further, the Handbook broadly addresses the Swedish government’s com-
mitment to prioritizing a gender perspective into the development of international trade stan-
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dards, simplifying trade and removing barriers in the services sector, advocating for the im-
provement of working conditions in developing countries, as well as collecting and analyzing 
gender-disaggregated data on women’s consumption and entrepreneurship for further research 
and response. 
Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy 
 Justin Trudeau famously began his work as Prime Minister by forming Canada’s first-
ever gender balanced Cabinet, providing the justification that, ‘because its 2015!’ when asked 
why he chose to do so. In October 2017, Canada launched its Feminist International Assistance 
Policy (FIAP). In this section I will outline the Canadian government’s motivations for the adop-
tion of such a policy. Further, I will discuss how this new “feminist” approach to FIAP and trade 
is outlined and implemented. While Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy is officially labeled as 
such, Canada instead employs the title of Feminist International Assistance Policy. This is likely 
because unlike Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy, which aims to include gender analysis at 
every step and in every sector of the foreign policymaking process, Canada’s FIAP is limited to 
humanitarian action which simultaneously seeks to eradicate poverty in developing countries. 
 According to the Canadian government, the primary objective of its FIAP is to, “con-
tribute to global efforts to eradicate poverty around the world.” The Canadian government rea-
sons that in order to eradicate poverty, it must address inequality. FIAP was born out of the con-
clusion that promoting the equality and empowerment of women and girls is the most effective 
approach to achieving these goals. 
 “Canada knows that women, as well as men, are full members of their society and must 
actively participate in the negotiations, reconciliation and reconstruction within their communi-
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ties required as a result of conflict. The path to peace needs empowered women because where 
women are included in peace processes, peace is more enduring, where women are included in 
the economy, economic growth is greater, where women are included in governance, states are 
more stable, where women are included in security, everyone is safer, where gender equality is 
upheld, societies are more peaceful. It is based on the understanding that addressing root causes 
of gender inequality requires the transformation of power relations associated with discrimina-
tion, coercion and violence in Canada and abroad. Increasing gender equality can deliver strong 
economic growth, help cut down on extreme poverty, reduce chronic hunger, benefit entire fami-
lies, and empower all those who face discrimination,” (Canada's Feminist International As-
sistance Policy, 2020). 
 Similarly to the Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy model, Canada’s FIAP also employs six 
areas of action. These areas are: (1) Gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls, 
(2) Human dignity, (3) Growth that works for everyone, (4) Environment and climate action, (5) 
Inclusive governance, and  (6) Peace and security. Canadian FIAP highlights the first of these 
goals as the core of its action plan. As such, Canada has pledges to fund initiatives that enhance 
the protection and promotion of the human rights of women and girls, increase the participation 
of women and girls in equal decision-making, and give women and girls more equitable access to 
and control over the resources they need to secure ongoing economic and social equality.  
 In 2019, the Canadian government released its FIAP action plan, which included the fol-
lowing objectives: increase the meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention, con-
flict resolution, and post-conflict state building, preventing and responding to ender-based vio-
lence perpetrated in conflict, and strengthen the capacity of peace operations to advance the WPS 
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agenda, including by deploying more women and fully embedding the WPS agenda into CAF 
operations and police deployments, (Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Secu-
rity, 2017-2022). With regards to the last of these objectives, Canadian Minister of National De-
fense, Harjit Singh Sajjan, suggests that, “the continued operational excellence of our military 
also requires that it reflect Canada in all its diversity, that it be inclusive, and that it provide at all 
times and in all ranks a respectful environment for women,”(Canada's Feminist International As-
sistance Policy, 2020). The conflict that arises when discussing military activity as part of a 
“feminist” agenda will be revisited later in this section. 
 As for the allocation of funding under the FIAP, targets outlined in the policy’s introduc-
tion include a minimum of 80 percent of Canadian international assistance to integrate gender 
equality and women’s and girls’ empowerment in pursuit of the FIAP’s goals, (Tiessen). They 
also include a minimum of 15 percent (up from around two percent in 2017) of Canadian in-
ternational assistance explicitly targeting gender equality and the empowerment of women and 
girls. Both of these goals are projected to be achieved by 2021-2022, (Canada’s National Action 
Plan on Women, Peace and Security, 2017-2022). 
Implementation 
 In relation to its FIAP, Canada has given special attention to “women’s rights” in the 
Middle East and North Africa. The Canadian government has found that in the region, more 
women than men attend university, yet women's participation in the labour market is less than 
half the world average. Women hold only 18 percent of parliamentary seats, and few women rise 
to positions of influence where they can participate in decisions that most affect the lives of 
women and girls. In politics, the Canadian government states that woman representatives are, 
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“catalysts of change, and that the leadership of women sparks reforms that benefit everyone,”  
including, “health and sanitation services, gender equality laws, parental leave and elimination of 
sexual and gender-based violence,”(Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy, 2020). 
While women’s participation and representation is important at every level of government, it is 
unclear that women will inherently make decisions that pursue a feminist agenda. While women 
may act within their own interests, women are not necessarily natural feminist actors.  
 With this in mind, Canada has stated that it wants to help equip women in Arab countries 
for more active roles in politics, at the heads of companies and in other decision-making spheres, 
and so the Canadian government pledges that “training” will be offered to more than 9,000 
women in Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. As a part of this “training,” the government states that 
“these women” will acquire new key leadership and management skills, and they will be “intro-
duced” to journalism and public speaking. Further, the government claims that they will be able 
to learn how their region’s political systems work, while women who are already leaders in their 
fields will be able to become trainers and mentors who will encourage other women, especially 
young women, to become “agents of change,” (Canada's Feminist International Assistance Poli-
cy, 2020). 
 Further, the Canadian government argues that communities also need to value women’s 
involvement in public affairs, and so  “seminars and meetings on gender equality and the politi-
cal rights of women” will be held in the three countries, including in rural areas, with the partici-
pation of about 3,000 men, (Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy, 2020). Canada’s 
Feminist International Assistance Policy also includes language on boys and mens’ roles in pur-
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suing its “feminist” agenda. Canada’s feminist approach involves men and boys as partners in 
transformative change, due to the policy’s assertion that men and boys can be powerful actors in 
preventing gender-based violence and the marginalization of women and girls, as well as in cre-
ating opportunities for them. Canada’s feminist approach further claims to challenge the normal-
ization of harmful gender relations. 
 Canada also includes a gender component to its “integrated response to the protracted 
crisis in the Middle East,” in particular referring to the complex armed conflict in Syria and Iraq 
and the resulting humanitarian crisis. While Global Affairs Canada provides more than $1.1 bil-
lion in multi-year humanitarian assistance to affected and displaced populations, the Canadian 
government also outlines that a, “particular effort” is being made to meet the needs of women 
and girls affected by the crises, (Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy, 2020). This 
“effort” includes psychosocial support and specialized medical services for the survivors of sex-
ual and gender-based violence, as well as the provision of reproductive health services. 
 The Canadian government has made further commitments to its objective of ensuring 
“human dignity for women and girls” affected by the hostilities in Iraq, which have led to the 
forced displacement of almost 5 million people. Canada recognizes that the conflict has been 
marked by serious violations of international humanitarian law, including sexual violence. The 
FIAP outlines how thousands of women and girls, particularly from the Yazidi community, have 
been abducted and have suffered unimaginable horrors, and that those who escape must over-
come serious injuries and trauma. Canada has assisted in the establishment of 29 community 
centers in refugee camps and communities in Kurdistan and other regions which are meeting the 
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urgent needs of thousands of women and girls every year. At the centers, survivors of sexual vio-
lence receive emergency care from gynecologists and mental health specialists. They also get 
clothing and hygiene items, they have access to reserved areas, where therapeutic activities help 
them overcome their physical and psychological wounds and their children can play in safe ar-
eas. Cases of serious sexual abuse, 90 percent of which have been committed against Yazidi 
women, are referred to a new, specialized centre in the city of Duhok. There, enhanced services 
are now available, including psychiatric care and legal assistance. 
 According to Canadian FIAP, 87 percent of Afghan women will be assaulted in their life-
times. Domestic and sexual violence are still widespread, as is child, early and forced marriage. 
Sexual harassment remains common in public places, workplaces and schools, and cases are 
rarely reported to authorities. The Canadian government has expressed its desire to, “help Afghan 
women assert their rights in these situations.” Together with the government and civil society, 
Canada is working to ensure that Afghan women receive equal treatment from public institutions, 
including the justice system. “Training sessions” are provided for police officers, paralegals and 
prosecutors which aim to ensure the legislation is interpreted accurately and truly protects com-
plainants’ rights.  
 The Canadian government reports helping civil society organizations, such as the Afghan 
Women’s Network, strengthen their skills in order to better advocate for the rights of women and 
girls. Canada is helping these women gain job skills to become financially independent, particu-
larly in agriculture and entrepreneurship. Information sessions are offered to religious and com-
munity leaders to raise their awareness of the risks entailed by child, early and forced marriage. 
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As a result of Canada’s efforts, the government claims that, “more and more Afghans recognize 
that violence-free families are healthier, better educated and more prosperous,” stating that, “with 
the support of society as a whole, women and girls will be empowered for the good of 
all,” (Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy, 2020). 
 Women’s participation in conflict resolution, as negotiators or mediators for example, 
makes peace agreements more durable. The Canadian government reports that when women ful-
ly participate in peace processes, agreements are 20% more likely to last at least two years and 
35% more likely to last 15 years, (Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy, 2020). 
Canada further claims that women have organized and performed mass action campaigns in fa-
vor of peace agreements more than any other group, pressuring parties to start negotiations and 
sign peace deals. Because men and women experience conflict and understand peace differently, 
women bring a different perspective to resolving conflict and building peace. They broaden and 
deepen the discussion on peace and security beyond the interests of combatting parties, they in-
crease community buy-in, and they help address the root causes of conflict.  
Canada and “feminist trade” 
 Canada’s government has adopted the title of "feminist donor,” not only in regards to its 
humanitarian provisions but also in its engagement with the private sector. While Canada’s 
“Feminist Trade Deals” are not included as a foundational pillar of the FIAP agenda, Canada in-
cludes women as one of the key underrepresented groups in its Trade Diversification Strategy, 
which aims to ensure that the benefits and opportunities that flow from trade are more widely 
shared. Canada has included language regarding the elimination of employment discrimination 
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by gender in its labour cooperation agreements and labour sections in Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs). However, mainstreaming gender considerations throughout its FTAs is a recent endeavor 
that has only been practiced since 2017, as marked by the  modernized Canada-Chile FTA. This 
new section, which builds upon the section on gender in the 2016 Chile-Uruguay FTA, is a first 
in terms of Canadian FTAs and a first for any G20 country. Since then, Canada has gone on to 
include a dedicated trade and gender section in its modernized Canada-Israel FTA. Going for-
ward, Canada has promised to ensure that FTAs include trade and gender sections as a priority.  
 Canada’s “feminist” approach pledges to fulfill additional goals with its FTA partners, such 
as prioritizing the improvement of working conditions for women — “including workers, busi-
nesswomen, and entrepreneurs.” The Canadian government also promises to establish a dedicat-
ed trade and gender committee, which is to be composed of officials from each party to the trade 
agreement. The “feminist” approach to FTAs also claims to “mainstream gender” by including 
gender-related provisions throughout a free trade agreement, in addition to including a  dedicated 
trade and gender section.  
 The Canadian government argues that this “gender mainstreaming" in trade policy can be 
used to promote access for women to trade and to advance gender equality and other gender-re-
lated objectives in its FTAs. These gender-related objectives may include policies that address 
the gender wage gap and gender-based discrimination in the workplace. Similarly, parties of an 
FTA may choose to require the nomination of women for the senior management or board of di-
rectors of an enterprise, or the inclusion of,  “provisions that ensure the wording ‘gender equali-
ty’ is included in the illustrative list of areas where parties reaffirm their right to regulate in the 
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public interest.” This paper will discuss the usage of language in Canada’s FIAP and “feminist” 
trade policy in its analysis. 
 Reactions to feminist foreign policies in the international relations community 
 The usage of the term “feminist” in both Sweden’s “Feminist Foreign Policy” and Cana-
da’s “Feminist International Assistance Policy” is worth examining. While the explicit employ-
ment of the words “feminist” and “feminism” may be refreshing to some, others may view the 
approach as “too radical,” or “too idealistic” to be taken seriously, especially against the wide-
spread practice of realpolitik, or “power politics,” (Robinson, 2) 
 A 2019 study conducted by Malena Rosen Sundstrom and Ole Elgstrom found that other 
European Union members generally perceived Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy positively, al-
though knowledge of the policy was often superficial. The study found that Sweden is generally 
regarded as a leader in the promotion of gender norms and although most respondents of the 
study were reported to believe that Feminist Foreign Policy had a positive effect on Sweden’s 
international image, it was unlikely that other states would make it a priority to follow suit in the 
coming years, (Sundstrom and Elgstrom). However, it is possible that this projection may change 
in light of the COVID-19 crisis, as Swedish Ambassador Wand-Danielsson noted how,  
It [the COVID-19 crisis] probably has exposed women's vulnerability… violence in the 
home has increased, women are more exposed to violence, women had to take the larger 
task at home now they're locked up with her husband and children. And, therefore, the 
issue is coming back more and more by highlighting with the vulnerability of women, 
even in a crisis situation. 
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 While Canada’s FIAP has been generally welcomed by the development community, sev-
eral sources have been critical of Canada’s actions, some of which appear to contradict its stated 
“feminist agenda.” The government faced criticism after the announcement that there would be 
marginal, if any, new funding allocated to FIAP, even as Canada continued to fall below the 
United Nations recommendation of 0.7% of GDP for foreign aid to begin with. This concern was 
furthered in context with an announcement given just two days earlier of a 70% increase in de-
fense spending, (Wyeth). Sweden has received similar criticism regarding its ongoing arms trade 
with Saudi Arabia, which I will outline further in the next section. 
Barriers to implementation 
 In this section, I will discuss several formal and informal barriers present to the integration 
of a feminist foreign policy. Despite a feminist foreign policy's assurance to pursue ethical ap-
proaches to counteract traditional hierarchies, the spaces in which foreign policy is made are in-
herently hierarchical. Powerful developed countries continue to hold dominion over the disen-
franchised Global South, while patriarchal structures permeate negotiations at every level, affect-
ing each actor in the international system. Further, as a “feminist” approach to international rela-
tions is in its early years of practice, governments with feminist foreign policy initiatives rest 
upon the support of several other actors in order to be successful and sustainable. With such a 
reliance on the approval of other nations and non-governmental organizations, “feminist” poli-
cies are required to strike a careful balance. In order to act with “feminist” values, the policy 
must be transformative as to shake up existing hierarchies, yet palatable enough to maintain the 
support of established actors. The term “feminism” alarms some international relations experts. 
As Jenny Nordberg wrote in The New Yorker, “Within the diplomatic community, where words 
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are carefully chosen so as not to offend, ‘feminism’ is usually avoided, as it risks being perceived 
as inflammatory and indicative of a stand against men.” (Nordberg) 
 Even those committed to a "feminist" agenda may worry about first world countries 
choosing to adopt the terminology of “feminist” in their foreign policy strategies. Among exist-
ing feminist academics and practitioners, the term “feminism” is one that is highly scrutinized 
and constantly evolving. While feminism as a term generally rests upon the notion of patriarchal 
resistance, one must understand “patriarchy” itself as a dynamic and flexible system that differs 
across physical, cultural, and temporal boundaries. Just as there is no universal form of patri-
archy, there is no universal form of feminism. As such, many feminist thinkers have recognized 
that feminism may never be able to speak for all women at all times, (Dow and Wood). Instead, a 
more useful assessment of a feminist policy begins with recognizing the diversity of many femi-
nisms, and from there, asking the question of, “whose feminism?” 
 There are also existing concerns in the international relations field that a feminist agenda is 
too radical, or wishes for too rapid change. While speaking to the pushback against gender equal-
ity initiatives abroad, Rachel Grimes discussed how, 
Some people in the British military tend to think that equality is only for democratic 
countries, and if we go to these which are democratic, we should, I mean, the biggest 
thing I hear is, “we've got to take small steps. We don't want to scare them, we want to, 
you know, win over their veterans. We can't go into a country and say, you know, why 
don't you open up the police or the military to women and things like that.” So, I'm a little 
bit disenchanted with that sort of approach. And I think that is very much alive issue… 
even in regional military organizations, such as NATO, there will be individuals in there 
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who just don't have equality for women as something that the military needs to be con-
cerned about. And I think that they're missing a big point for those that want a stable, se-
cure country. And it's not just about stopping people from fighting using weapons. It's 
also about giving the civilian population, both men and women, the same opportunities. 
 Additionally, feminism, and more broadly, “women's issues,” are still considered, by most 
states in the international system, as special interest policy spaces, rather than those that are 
treated as integral to all affairs of the state. This creates a lack of urgency to act within “gen-
dered" lines, especially in times of crisis or national emergency. When questioned about this 
trend in relation to the COVID-19 crisis, Ambassador Wand-Danielsson insisted that, “ in my 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it [the focus on “women's issues”] has not faded, it’s still the main 
issue.” In September 2020, Minister for Gender Equality Åsa Lindhagen released a statement, 
acknowledging how, “the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the risk of women being subjected 
to men’s violence and to discrimination and marginalization, and has led to additional challenges 
in efforts to advance gender equality,” (Joint Press Statement Protecting Sexual and Reproduc-
tive Health and Rights and Promoting Gender-Responsiveness in the COVID-19 Crisis, 2020). 
The Swedish government announced that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had developed target-
ed support for the Foreign Service, presumably to address this linkage. In March 2021, approxi-
mately a year since the outbreak of the pandemic, Justin Trudeau’s government unveiled an all-
women task force to address gender inequality issues laid bare by COVID-19, although the pro-
gram appears to be limited to informing domestic policy, (Cision Canada). 
Comparison and analysis 
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 In this section I will consider reflections on Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy and Cana-
da’s Feminist International Assistance Policy using a transnational feminist lens. While there 
have been some promising moves on behalf of governments regarding funding for local women’s 
groups and programs promoting reproductive rights and access to family planning, including 
safe, legal abortion, there are still concerns about the ultimate effectiveness of so-called “top- 
down feminism,” or “state feminism” in the context of development and its ability to implement 
real or sustainable change. 
 Neither the Swedish nor Canadian policy explicitly define the term “feminism.” This 
could be perceived as something negative, due to the lack of clear direction. However, the ambi-
guity of these terms can also serve as a way to allow more flexibility in approach and measures 
of outcome. Further, both models take for granted the assumption that there is a well-accepted or 
generally understood definition of terms like “feminism,” “gender equality,” and “women’s em-
powerment.” In the context of a feminist policy, neither Feminist Foreign Policy or FIAP estab-
lish an explicitly defined “feminism,” and instead seemingly treat it as one set of approaches 
when there are, in fact, an array of feminist lenses. When questioned on the definition of the 
word “feminist,” in the policy, Ambassador Wand-Danielsson responded that, “I think you need 
the flexibility, I would definitely say the flexibility is important.” 
 While there are several identifiable characteristics of the feminist foreign policy agendas, 
feminist foreign policy remains a contested term. Further, there is limited discussion of the inter-
sectional realities of women and girls in the Canadian Feminist International Assistance Policy 
handbook. While the Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy handbook does include language that ac-
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knowledges women face unique challenges within their own contexts, no specific examples are 
outlined. Ambassador Wand-Danielsson describes how, 
 We will never go tell African countries, Latin American or Asian countries what to do, 
we will work always partnering with local entities who, then, are the driving force, who 
will identify the projects and, of course, then share experiences… So I think that it is, 
adapt to local circumstances, let them define what's important to them… The exchange of 
experiences be at north, south or east, west or lower than the EU, I think is a very impor-
tant part of this our work great.  
Thus, it could be argued that this omission of specific examples in the Swedish handbook is pur-
poseful, instead allowing for flexibility and deferral. What makes the foreign policy ‘feminist’ is 
contingent on a country’s specific conditions and environment. 
 While these feminist foreign policies have different strengths and weaknesses, both are no-
table for explicitly acknowledging gender equality as a core component for achieving foreign 
policy goals. For Sweden, gender equality is a goal in and of itself, while it does coincide with 
additional foreign policy goals. Canada is explicit in their approach to gender equality as a 
mechanism to achieve other desirable foreign policy outcomes, including the reduction of pover-
ty and trade diversification. For Sweden, gender inequality is the central problem that feminist 
foreign policy must address. Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy is a continuation of domestic 
commitments, international treaty promises, and its membership of international and transnation-
al bodies. Its policy works from systematically mainstreaming feminist understandings into the 
workings of state bodies, human rights discourse, and political institutions. It presents a liberal 
feminist outlook on foreign policy, which can work within existing national and international 
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structures to enact change. Canada’s feminist foreign policy does not conceive of gender inequal-
ity in such a central fashion as Sweden. Instead, poverty is understood as the key problem to be 
tackled in the international assistance policy, and a feminist policy is the way to achieve this.  
Differing approaches to feminist practice  
 Since the 1960s, there has been a separation between Western feminists and “Third 
World” feminists. This occurred largely because Western feminists subscribed to white, liberal 
feminist perspectives, which focus on the “universal” patriarchal oppression of women, rather 
than recognize the unique disadvantages women are subject to as a result of colonial and global-
ized imbalances, (Mohanty, 346). Women in developing countries then argued that Western fem-
inism did not represent them or align with their struggles. Thus, transnational feminist move-
ments allied together to recognize both the continued significance of patriarchal distinctions be-
tween nations, as well as their transcendence by feminist movements across borders. Thus, a 
transnational feminist approach was created in opposition to the white, liberal feminist assump-
tion that the “monolithic, Third World” woman is subject to the same oppression as the Western 
woman, (Mohanty, 333). 
 White, western liberal feminists have generally emphasized the value of freedom for 
women and argue that the state is responsible, at least partly, for ensuring this freedom, (Baehr). 
While liberal feminists understand “freedom” differently, the principal tenants of liberal femi-
nism emphasize the importance of individual women’s freedom from coercive interference, as 
well as the freedom to pursue personal and political autonomy, (Baehr). Liberal feminism has a 
long tradition of working within the structure of mainstream society to integrate women into that 
structure, while transnational approaches recognize feminism as both a liberatory formation and 
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a practice that has been oppressed by and sometimes been complicit with colonialism, racism, 
and imperialism. Post-colonial, “third world,” and transnational feminist scholars such as Spivak, 
Abu-Lughod, and Mohanty have critiqued the approaches taken by Western liberal feminists. 
While the white, Western liberal feminist agenda promotes organization through the notion of a 
“shared womanhood,” or “global sisterhood,” it has long been argued that this “universalism” of 
the women’s experience has glossed over differences of class and race, which ultimately leave 
poor and non-white women out of important discourse, (Mohanty, 334).  
 These “cracks” in the Western liberal feminist agenda only become more pronounced 
across national boundaries. Transnational feminist scholars have argued that white, Western fem-
inisms have ignored the differences between themselves and non-white, Western women, despite 
incredibly diverse experience of oppression that is contingent upon historical and cultural differ-
ences. Further transnational feminist work has highlighted the difficulties faced by feminists 
from the Third World in being heard within the broader feminist movement. Ultimately, any le-
gitimate evaluation of patriarchy and feminism hinges upon the analysis of power relationships. 
While Western liberal feminism focuses on the inequality in power between men and women as 
almost monolithic categories, transnational feminism calls for the reflection of the unequal pow-
er relationships between Western and Non-Western feminists, arguing that liberal feminism fails 
to recognize the power dynamics that are in play with women of color and transnational women, 
which involve multiple sources of oppression. 
 There is a long history of “state feminisms” that Western countries have attempted to 
“export” to the Middle East. Several transnational feminist scholars have criticized Western in-
tervention that is justified through means of “saving brown women from brown men,” (Spivak). 
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Scholar and feminist critic Gayatri Spivak argues that imperialism has been historically justified 
under the guide of “liberating” non-Western women from traditional, “barbaric” practices and 
systems. Spivak argues that “subaltern” women are used as “symbols,” merely representations 
framed and created by the West to justify imperial and colonial endeavors as rescue missions, of 
sorts. Similarly, Lila Abu-Lughod’s work, Do Muslim Women Need Saving?, presents a similar 
assessment of this long-standing mindset that has justified all manner of foreign interference, in-
cluding military invasion, in the name of rescuing women from Islam.  
 Both of these works refute the “West” as “rescuer,” and instead describe the exportation 
of Western patriarchy to a non-Western context, otherwise known as “colonial feminism,” where-
in women are colonized in a twofold way by imperialism and male dominance. These works 
highlight the existence of a "white woman's burden"  or white savior complex. Critics such as 2
Black feminists and postcolonial feminists assert that mainstream liberal feminism reflects only 
the values of middle-class, heterosexual, white women and fails to appreciate the position of 
women of different races, cultures, or classes. With this, white liberal feminists reflect the issues 
that underlie the White savior complex. They do not understand women that are outside the dom-
inant society but try to "save" or "help" them by pushing them to assimilate to their ideals of 
feminism. As such, when examining contemporary forms of Western interventions, even those 
which operate under the presumption of “humanitarianism,” it is important to question whether 
policy truly pursues a feminist agenda, or merely intrumentalizes women. 
 The phrase "white woman's burden" derives from Rudyard Kipling’s "The White Man's Bur2 -
den.”
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 Chandra Tolpade Mohanty, a feminist critic and author of cornerstone pieces in transna-
tional feminism such as Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity, 
and “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses,” unpacks this question 
by addressing the divide between Western liberal feminism and “postcolonial,” or “Third World” 
feminism. Mohanty critiques the political project of Western feminism and its discursive con-
struction of the category of the "Third World woman" as a generic, homogenous, victimized 
stereotype that Western feminists must save. Mohanty plays an integral role in articulating con-
cerns about Western feminism's failure to account for non-Western subjects. She critiques femi-
nism during this time period to be more inclusive of intersectional struggles, identifying that 
feminism and inequalities are not linear, and the idea of female being a basis of shared oppres-
sion ignored the individual within their specific context and time. The term "transnational" is re-
action and the rejection of terms like "international" and "global" feminism. Transnational femi-
nists believe that the term "international" puts more emphasis on nation-states as distinct entities, 
and that "global" speaks to liberal feminist theories on "global sisterhood" that ignore Third 
World women and women of color's perspectives on gender inequality and other problems glob-
alization inherently brings. It rejects the idea that people from different regions have the same 
subjectivities and experiences with gender inequality. 
Feminist foreign policy and the military-industrial complex 
 Given that war is seen as particularly detrimental to the well being of women, one might 
ask how a feminist foreign policy considers and justifies military activity. In 2017, Sweden de-
scribed success in strengthening a “gender equality perspective” in disarmament and non-prolif-
eration. Despite this, Sweden has been criticized for pursuing a “feminist” agenda while simulta-
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neously trading arms with Saudi Arabia. How can Sweden reconcile providing aid to Yemen 
while still arming the country that is enacting incredible violence unto Yemen? In Revisiting 
Gendered States: Feminist Imaginings of the State in International Relations, Tickner, et al. ar-
gue that perhaps Sweden, in its efforts to discard its neutral past, deploys concepts of gendered 
protection to make permissible its new military engagements (Tickner, 83). However, when 
questioned on this notion, Swedish Ambassador Wand-Danielsson insisted that perceptions of 
neutrality do not guide feminist foreign policy decisions, stating, “we gave up neutrality when 
we joined the EU in ’95.” 
 The Canadian government has faced similar criticism for supplying military equipment to 
Saudi Arabia. Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy also addresses gender main-
streaming of the Canadian Armed Forces, as the Canadian government draws a clear connection 
between women’s participation in peace operations and the effectiveness of the missions. women 
and men alike are more likely to report sexual and gender-based incidents of violence when they 
can speak to women officers. This and other evidence shows that when women are put in key 
roles in peace operations, peace processes and military deployments, the effectiveness of the 
missions and processes increases considerably. 
 There is concern that women are thrusted into peacekeeping spaces by feminist foreign 
policy efforts as a result of existing patriarchal symbols and essentialized notions of gendered 
care. That is to say, it is possible that women are being instrumentalized due to their association 
as inherent caregivers or healers. Karen Garner in her book, Women and Gender in International 
History: Theory and Practice, argues that,  
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Women may be gender stereotyped as natural peace makers because women have the bio-
logical potential to give birth and therefore have a special interest in nurturing human 
life. These gender stereotypes of women as victims of wars, keepers of traditions, sym-
bols of the nation, peacemakers, and nurturers predominate in many cultures (Garner, 39)  
When presenting the benefits to peace, security, economics, etc. that come from women’s inclu-
sion, there does exist a fine line between gender justice and instrumentalizing women. Thus, 
states and other actors must take care that they fall on the side of gender justice. 
 Often, the inclusion of women as soldiers and peacekeepers is regarded as an effective in-
telligence collection tool. The Canadian government further reifies this instrumentalism, report-
ing that in post-conflict states, up to 40% of households are headed by women, making women 
highly attuned to their community’s reconstruction needs. Evidence shows that “with access to 
income generation and economic security as a result of just peace agreement outcomes, women 
tend to be quicker to invest in child welfare and education, to build food security, and to rebuild 
rural economies, greatly contributing to longer term stability.” In regards to women in military, 
Rachel Grimes similarly argues that, “Men will say, ‘well, okay, we need the women to talk to 
women,’ and they look at it from a functionalist approach. I think with the military, you're proba-
bly going to get the functionalist approach being taken onboard more than the fact that it is the 
right thing to do. 
 Not surprisingly, many observers regard the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia as existing in out-
right contradiction to the aims of feminist foreign policy. According to feminist political theorist 
Fiona Robinson, Saudi Arabia represents a sort of “test case” for feminist foreign policy. While 
Saudi Arabia is well known in the West as a flagrant denier of women’s rights, Saudi Arabia re-
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mains an ‘ally’ of the West as an importer of arms from many Western countries and a fellow 
fighter in the war against Islamic terrorism. While not denying this, Robinson suggests that our 
attention should shift away from this contradiction – which again relies on binary logics and as-
sumptions of, “essential difference between Saudi Arabia (authoritarian, backward and violent) 
and Sweden/Canada (democratic, progressive and peaceful,)” (Robinson, 3).  
 Policymakers and diplomats must aim to build understanding by recognizing the material 
and discursive factors that have constructed, over time, the relationships between Saudi Arabia 
and Sweden/Canada, as well as the ways in which patriarchal institutions and structures – across 
the globe and at multiple scales – hinder the possibility of attentive listening and connection 
across national borders and cultural/religious difference. It is only through the prism of this rela-
tionship – where difference takes on meaning – that the more complex role of Western states in 
the contemporary system of transnational militarism is revealed. Furthermore, countries such as 
Sweden and Canada must recognize that progressive change on women’s and human rights in a 
country like Saudi Arabia can never be imposed by ethical or feminist Western governments. 
Countries espousing feminist foreign policies must refuse to buy in to an order of living that 
‘splits humans into the superior and the inferior,” (Robinson) 
4. Significance and Application in the Middle East 
 While both feminist foreign policies and the transnational feminist agenda claim to be 
interested in “global justice,” we must ask what this means and theory, and in practice, specifi-
cally towards the in the Middle East and North Africa, a region that has historically suffered 
great harm by and Western intervention and imperialism. Feminist foreign policy agendas are not 
"introducing" feminism to the Middle East and North Africa. Rather, countries in the region have 
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employed “state feminisms" of their own, that may very well be in conflict with the feminist for-
eign policy agendas of either Sweden or Canada. 
State feminisms in the Middle East 
 In some Middle Eastern and North African countries, “state feminisms” have been linked 
with secularization movements and the adoption of a “Western” progressivity. Women were, 
again, used as symbols to signify modernity, and their “liberated” status was designed to contrast 
the then-rising Islamist movements of the early-to-mid 20th century. Several Western scholars 
have pointed to the Ataturk regime in Turkey, for example, as “one of the most important success 
stories of women's empowerment in the early twentieth century,” (White) 
 Ataturk’s vision for Turkey was both secular and Western-inspired. He also made the 
judgment that, as a modern state, Turkey must lead the way for Turkish women to be equal with 
men, (Bennett, 111) Consequently, the Kemalist initiative tasked itself with “granting” gender 
equality to women through Turkey’s administration and educational efforts.  At this point, Tur-
key was preparing to be a beacon for the world as well as a role model for all other Muslim 
countries.  However, this masculinist administration, “‘emancipated’ women because it suited 
them ideologically, then did little to encourage their political empowerment,” (Bennett, 114) 
While Turkey achieved high standards of women’s literacy and female employment in some sec-
tors, politics remained almost exclusively a male domain. Kemalists both actively discouraged 
women from wearing the headscarf and circulated the idea that women in public threaten social 
order, and by extension, that their visibility should be minimized. Kemalism furthered this agen-
da by “developing a stereotype of a Turkish woman: modest in appearance, companion to her 
male in modernizing the country,” (Bennett, 114) As a result, women’s participation in political 
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life remained low, and after the introduction of multi-party, competitive politics in 1945, the 
number of women in parliament fell. Today, just 103 of 600 seats in Turkish parliament are held 
by women, (Avundukluoglu). 
 Often, “women’s legislation” has been performative — a form of pageantry used to cu-
rate and sustain the image of a feminist nation — rather than a mechanism of ensuring the rights 
and freedoms of the women who live with the consequences of said legislation. These reforms by 
the "feminist" state did not evolve as a result of demands originating within society, but were im-
posed from above. Furthermore, state feminism often does not concern itself with what happens 
behind closed doors, but focuses instead on expanding women's public roles, (Mazur and 
McBride, 252). “State feminism” can, thus, be a way that the government takes over the role of 
speaking for and on behalf of women, rather than allowing women themselves speak and make 
demands. Rather than understanding “women’s legislation” as inherently feminist, we must in-
stead analyze “state feminist” agendas as top-down social engineering projects, motivated by 
their own, independent contexts and ulterior or concurrent motives.  
Implications of contemporary feminist foreign policies in the Middle East 
 Much of Canada’s focus on “feminist” endeavors in the Middle East and North Africa 
rely on training and education programs. This trend does raise concern of the Western perpetua-
tion of neoliberal ideals, which may place further undue burden on the very women the policy 
claims to uplift, rather than address the systemic factors which maintain these women's oppres-
sion in the first place. Further, the language used in Canada's Feminist International Assistance 
Policy employs the premise that Canada is “introducing" feminism to Middle Eastern and North 
African women, which only serves to undermine how these women already resist, or even bene-
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fit from, the patriarchal structures present within their own unique contexts. Cynthia Enloe dis-
cusses this tension in her book, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of In-
ternational Politics, arguing that, “those who are trying to persuade women to ‘become in-
formed’ are not inviting women to reinterpret international politics by drawing on their own ex-
periences as women.” (Enloe, 33) 
 Both Canada and Sweden claim to work with not only women, but also men in Middle 
Eastern and North African target countries. While the incorporation of men into a feminist for-
eign policy is indeed pertinent to creating a comprehensively gender-sensitive agenda, similar 
concerns regarding Western imposition of normative gender roles exist. Thus, this notion of 
“feminist re-education” that is present in both the Canadian and Swedish models to differing de-
grees suggests that these policies works instrumentally, rather than transformatively, in their re-
spective pursuits of “global gender equality.” 
 The language in the Swedish model of feminist foreign policy insists on taking a more 
“intersectional" approach. Through its explicit partnerships with regional   organizations and 
consistent acknowledgement of unique challenges that women face in their own contexts, rather 
than relying upon a general notion of “African,” “Arab,” or “third-world,” women, Sweden is 
arguably more closely informed by a transnational feminist approach. In any case, it is impera-
tive that “Western” states, academics, and other actors reject the implicit notion that feminist for-
eign policies are “enlightening” Middle Eastern and North African women through their export 
of "feminist education.” Further, it must be recognized that the ambiguity as a feature in both 
feminist foreign policy initiatives regarding the definition of "feminism" can lead to a lack of 
transnational analysis and understanding. 
  Page !  of !46 54
5. Conclusion 
 Gender equality connects to global prosperity, contributes to economic growth, contributes 
to stronger democracies, improving security, more efficient use of foreign aid, improves health of 
family, communities, societies. Investing in gender equality would pursue other foreign policy 
priorities. However, many institutions continue to act as though this were not the case. In the in-
ternational relations community in particular, diplomats must recognize that doing their work 
requires engaging with women and girls, and local community members from a broad range of 
backgrounds. That is to say, the "work" of pursuing a feminist agenda does not end at adding the 
language of "and women and girls” in policy. 
 Both Sweden and Canada's policies, as well as UNSCR 1325, stress the importance of 
women’s representation in spaces where decisions are being made. Several countries have insti-
tuted “gender quotas” in their governing bodies in recent years following this same notion. How-
ever, it is unclear whether simply adding female bodies to these spaces is truly in line with the 
pursuit of a feminist agenda. It can be argued that individual women gaining decision-making 
power in an unquestioned masculinist governing system is not “feminist.” Of course, women, 
like men, are prone to acting within their own interests. However, in order to achieve sustainable 
transformative change, we must question the reliance on “magical” thinking that suggests 
women in power will inherently pursue feminist agendas. Further, we must further explore how 
we may construct narratives of “good” female or gender minority leadership that are not reduc-
tive or dependent on essentialized notions of care. Further, with its emphasis on the binary of 
men and women, both feminist foreign policies also fail to encompass all genders. 
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 The structures that guide the formation and implementation of foreign policy are based on 
modern states and are inherently colonial. Thus, we must consider how it may be possible to ad-
vocate for a more inclusive foreign policy in a system that in itself perpetuates structural inequal-
ity. To begin, countries must practice critical self reflection and take care to avoid “exporting” 
the Western patriarchy present in their own societies. That is to say, when attempting to tackle 
gender inequality in the Global South, states must resist applying context-blind solutions by act-
ing within white liberal feminist values. In contrast, a transformative feminist lens instead en-
courages actors, including states, to question and reform preexisting patriarchal systems, rather 
than solely attempt to work within them.  
 A transnational feminist agenda calls for the integration of the lived experience of women 
in their own contexts to any “feminist" action. Women and girls possess unique experiences and 
different needs, and as such a feminist policy must analyze factors that are relevant to its policy 
targets in addition to simple gender identification. that come from the different realities of 
women. Therefore, states must be specific, and identify which women and which girls they are 
discussing at all times, as well as include these women at the decision-making level. Further, 
specific goals and achievements must be outlined, as opposed to relying on ambiguous language 
of “women’s empowerment” as a projected outcome. 
 The feminist foreign policy agenda in particular developed rapidly in the 2010’s and 
gained a foothold in national and international discourse, although the official adoption of such a 
gender strategy has only been enacted by Sweden, Canada, and, most recently, Mexico in 2020. 
While the UK, France, Luxembourg, and Australia have all discussed intentions to adopt a femi-
nist foreign policy, they have yet to do so at the time of writing. While there are very few states 
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that declared an explicitly feminist foreign policy, many others are simply gender mainstreaming. 
I offer various reasons for this. To begin, the label of “feminist” can be off-putting due to its per-
ceived radicality, and therefore “gender” is often employed as more acceptable choice of lan-
guage. Often, these labels both refer to the realm of women and girls, further reifying that “un-
marked” foreign policy is not fundamentally formulated with their interests in mind.  
 Thus, it is imperative that a “fully gender-inclusive” policy must address such variables 
as cultural norms, discrimination, political processes and institutionalized gender inequality, and 
examine how and where they intersect. Policy implementation must include input and advice 
from local organizations that are aware of marginalization, as well as from individuals who have 
lived the experience of inequality and understand its local context. However, this paper does not 
necessarily insist that every Western nation should adopt a “feminist” foreign policy, or that ex-
isting policies do not come with their own risks and criticisms. 
 In conclusion, a “feminist consciousness” is undoubtedly needed in the international rela-
tions field, particularly in the practice of foreign policy. However, it is unclear if a Western state 
feminism answers this call to action ethically or adequately. To begin, a state feminism such as 
feminist foreign policy works intrumentally, rather than transformatively, to address existing 
global gender imbalances, which remains a point of concern for various feminist critics. Further, 
current and future Western state feminisms must take care to not contribute to a long history of 
imperial endeavors in the Middle East and North Africa under the premise of “empowering” its 
women. Achieving global gender justice is not one event, but rather a process that in any case 
calls for a profound reordering of values in the international community.  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